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Reforming Regulation of Financial
Services in the United States:
Issues and Opportunities
1. Introduction
Probably no other area of the American economy has changed as greatly
over the last five to ten years as that of banking and finance. American
financial markets have seen significant experimentation with new products
and services, the emergence of new competitors not previously associated
with traditional financial activities and numerous mergers and acquisitions
among previously distinct types of firms. If anything, the impact of these
changes has been to make most sectors of our financial markets even
more intensely competitive than they were traditionally.
Many of these financial market changes stem from changes in the underlying U.S. economy. Beginning in the late 1970s inflation and the resultant higher levels of interest rates significantly affected the way consumers and businesses managed their financial assets, as well as significantly
altering the attractiveness of various traditional financial businesses. The
more recent rapid disinflation and severe weaknesses in particular sectors
of the economy such as energy and agriculture have caused additional
dislocations for financial institutions.
In addition to greater volatility in financial markets, the financial services industry has been significantly affected by new technology. Exponential improvements in data processing and telecommunications have
made it economically feasible for firms to deliver financial services irrespective of geographic proximity. New technology has also permitted
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creation of whole new markets and financial products that offer competition to older types of financial services.
Internationalization of the world's financial markets has also had a
significant impact on the U.S. financial system. Because of instantaneous
and low-cost communications, markets and exchanges in different countries increasingly compete for business. Among other things, such competition can have a significant influence on both employment levels and
trade balances of a service-oriented economy. This increasingly global
marketplace means, among other things, that regulatory or other policies
that may produce significant inefficiencies will result in redistribution of
both employment and world market share for U.S. firms.
At one time, the United States was the undisputed leader in pursuing
financial market efficiency and removing unnecessary regulatory controls-such as interest rate ceilings. Recently, however, the pace of deregulation has slowed in the United States due to entrenched opposition
from special interest industry groups, while other nations, including the
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and others, are moving to catch up with
our efforts. Given the ease of relocating financial activities, those countries that are most successful in creating an efficient financial system will
be likely to reap significant benefits. As only one example, it should be
obvious that one result of the Glass-Steagall Act' has been to shift underwriting jobs with major U.S. banks from New York to London. Whether
this is in the long-run national interest of the United States remains to be
seen.
Internationalization and technological change are not the only forces
of change in the financial services industry. Indeed, elimination of government controls on interest rates has had an enormous and largely positive impact as well. In the short-term, rate deregulation prevented the
complete destruction of our system of insured depository institutions
through uncontrollable disintermediation. Over the long run, rate deregulation should significantly benefit consumers, improve our national rate
of savings, and increase economic efficiency.
Although its long-run impact will be strongly positive, the elimination
of controls on interest rates has made the banking and thrift businesses
far more complex and difficult. Without the levelling effect of Regulation
Q and the interest rate subsidy it provided, 2 there will be greater variability
I. The Banking Act of 1933 addressed various aspects of banking regulation in the wake
of the national banking collapse that led to the banking holiday in March 1933. A portion
of the statute, now popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, restricts affiliations between
commercial banks and investment banking firms. These provisions are codified in various
sections of Title 12 of the United States Code. For example, section 16 of the Act is found
at 12 U.S.C. § 24 Seventh (1984), while section 21 is found at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982).
2. See 12 U.S.C. § 371b (1982), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 3506(b)(4)-(6) (1982). See also
12 C.F.R. § 217 (1986).
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in the earnings of banks and thrifts over the next few years. This more
difficult operating environment is also certain to lead to at least somewhat
greater consolidation of the U.S. banking system.
Another factor that is changing the face of the U.S. financial system is
the steady commingling of the marketplace, as different types of firms
introduce products and services that compete across traditional industry
lines. This trend is especially visible in commercial banking, where we
have more participation by investment banking, insurance and other types
of domestic financial firms, as well as foreign banks, than was true even
five years ago. Indeed, there is probably not a single major financial
product that does not have closely fungible substitutes offered by various
different types of firms. If anything, this trend is increasing as major
categories of bank or thrift direct lending are "securitized" to facilitate
secondary market trading and significant cost savings.
As a result of these trends, strongly managed banks and thrifts will
prosper even more than they did before "deregulation," but weaker firms
may also fail more quickly, and with larger losses. In short, marketplace
changes have confronted our financial regulatory system with both new
challenges and new opportunities.
II. Proposals for Change
In several major areas, reforms to our current financial regulatory system can benefit the public by increasing the competitiveness of U.S.
financial institutions and by maintaining the strongest possible financial
system.

A.

PRODUCT AND SERVICE DIVERSIFICATION

It is an axiom of business that any institution can help build resistance
to risk by diversifying its activities. Despite this fact, the United States
3
has a series of statutes (including the Glass-Steagall Act, the McFadden
4
5
and Douglas Acts, and the Bank Holding Company Act ) which seriously
limit the abilities of banks and securities firms to diversify their operations.
These restraints apply most severely to bank holding companies, which
are prohibited from engaging in a wide variety of financial activities that
may be less risky than banking itself.

3. Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1925-1927) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
4. Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 3, 70 Stat. 134 (1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1982)).
5. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
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Most types of financial products cannot be categorized as inherently
risky or safe. Rather, the manner of conducting the activity, not the type
of product, usually determines the level of risk. Indeed, the level of risk
from a particular activity may vary greatly between specific firms depending on such variables as management capabilities, capital resources,
corporate structure, hedging strategies, synergistic product lines, or other
factors. Consequently, absolute legal barriers to entry into particular areas
of financial activity (such as the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding
Company Act) are an overbroad response to potential problems. Indeed,
such laws both impair competition in our financial markets and actually
reduce the stability of many firms.
Current product restrictions are certainly impossible to justify as measures to reduce risk for banks or other types of federally insured institutions. For example, selling insurance policies and brokering securities
unquestionably involve less transaction risk than making commercial loans.
Yet "risk" is often used as the justification for prohibiting bank entry into
insurance or securities brokerage. Corporate loans expose a bank to credit
risks for several years. During this time, the bank has an illiquid asset
whose value may be adversely affected by a myriad of domestic or foreign
problems. By contrast, securities or insurance brokerage would offer banks
an opportunity to earn fee income without incurring appreciable transactional risk.
Unfortunately, by restricting competition from banks in insurance and
securities brokerage and underwriting, current law has the effect of protecting inefficient practices and areas of market concentration. As a result,
the public will pay higher prices than necessary, and U.S. financial competitiveness will be reduced. Perhaps most seriously, however, arbitrary
legal restrictions prevent affected firms from gradually adjusting to changing market conditions. The result can be a crisis of systemic proportions,
as demonstrated by the thrift industry in the early 1980s.
One future risk to the entire banking system, for example, is represented
by the Glass-Steagall Act. 6 Many banking products have been "securitized" in recent years. Rather than traditional bank loans, most major
corporations now fund their short-term liquidity needs with commercial
paper due to its lower cost. Many investors also prefer to purchase mortgage-backed securities rather than individual mortgages due to both liquidity and credit advantages. Automobile loans, commercial receivables,
lease revenues and other areas are also being increasingly securitized and
sold to investors.
This evolution of portfolio lending into a system of loan origination and
the packaging and distribution of securities for trading in secondary mar6. See supra note 1.
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kets offers many advantages. It can reduce costs for borrowers, minimize
credit risks for financial intermediaries, and permit better matching of
interest rate risks. However, as the traditional bank and thrift businesses
evolve in this direction, Glass-Steagall may prevent banks and thrifts from
following the evolution of their own markets. In so doing, the Act may
prevent banks and thrifts from gradually adapting to changing markets
until substantial damage has occurred.
In recognition of the need to begin modifying some of the most inflexible
and anticompetitive restrictions, in 1984 the Senate passed (by a vote of
89-5) a statute to permit bank holding companies to engage in carefully
limited new activities. 7 Indeed, based on proposals of the Administration,
the bill generally required such new activities to be conducted in legally
separate subsidiaries of a bank holding company in order to prevent losses
from non-banking activities from hutting the subsidiary bank.
The holding company requirement was also designed to prevent a bank
from utilizing its lower cost of capital and the implicit protection of its
deposit insurance as it competed in new product markets. However, even
if the Senate bill had become law, many financial activities (such as the
sale or underwriting of insurance and underwriting of corporate securities)
would have remained "off limits" for banks. Eventually we must consider
replacing all such arbitrary restrictions on purely financial activities with
more flexible prudential limitations.
B.

GEOGRAPHIC RESTRAINTS

Federal law has traditionally fostered a decentralized banking system
by prohibiting interstate branching or acquisition of banks across state
lines without state approval. 8 Decentralization creates many strengths in
our system, but too much decentralization exposes banks to serious loss
or even failure due to local events such as falling prices for a single local
commodity, plant closings or other factors.
For a variety of reasons, interstate and intrastate operating restrictions
on banks are being rapidly repealed or reduced by the states. 9 With the
Supreme Court's resolution of any constitutional issues regarding regional

7. See S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S11,162 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
8. See, e.g., President's Report to Congress, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial
Banking in the United States (Dept. of the Treasury, 1981).
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-217-6-218 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-553-36-557 (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (1985); MD.
FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 5-901-5-908, 5-1001-5-1007 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
167A, § 2 (West 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-30-I-19-30-13 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 71-702-7-1-705 (1985). To date, thirty-eight states have adopted at least partidil interstate
banking authority.
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state compacts, 10 the trend to multistate banking is accelerating. Congress
is now considering a national "trigger" to full interstate banking, I I with
the Administration supporting such legislation as the best means to assure
an orderly transition in the industry and to prevent discrimination against
particular states. Even if Congress does not act, however, there can be
little doubt that most states will adopt laws permitting some degree of
interstate banking in the foreseeable future.
Previous branching limits operated as de facto antitrust laws. Indeed,
some bank regulators and others have recently urged Congress to replace
the arbitrary branching restrictions with equally arbitrary special limits
on mergers or acquisitions among the largest banks, or which would result
12
in any firm holding more than a fixed percentage of total deposits.
Adopting such a law would be a serious mistake. Banks should be treated
exactly like any other type of firm for antitrust purposes, without any
special advantages or disadvantages. 13 Indeed, one of the most important
tasks in the next few years is to fashion a far more comprehensive antitrust
analysis for financial institutions than exists today. Significant improvements are required to identify properly the relevant product markets, to
measure true market power and to evaluate realistically potential domestic
and foreign competition in an environment largely free of traditional legal
barriers to entry.
C.

CAPITAL ADEQUACY

Another area of possible improvement to system stability is that of
capital levels for banks and thrifts. Adequate capital is essential to a stable
financial system for several reasons. Private capital is the most important
discipline to excessive or imprudent risk-taking. In addition, capital serves
as a buffer between operating losses of banks or thrifts and the deposit
insurance systems. In effect, capital serves as an outfield warning track
for the regulators, giving them vital time to uncover and deal with problems before net worth becomes negative.
While capital plays a key role in financial regulation, the level of capital
that is desirable will vary over time in relationship to the external economic environment. Indeed, after the three U.S. bank regulators recently

10. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System_
U.S.-.
105 S. Ct. 2545 (1985).
11. See, e.g., H.R. 20, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H66 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1985); 131 CONG. Rirc. E3625 (daily ed. July 31, 1985).
12. See, e.g.. H.R. 2707, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.. 131 CONG. REC. E3618-20 (daily ed. July
31, 1985).
13. See Blueprint for Reform, The Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial
Services, at 92 (1984).
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increased the capital requirements for domestic banks to six percent of
assets, 14 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Federal
Reserve Board have proposed new and risk-adjusted capital systems designed to be more flexible and to reduce the capital penalty for short-term
liquid assets such as cash and government securities.
In early 1985, a Treasury Department study of the deposit insurance
system recommended nine percent across-the-board capital levels, using
a combination of primary capital and long-term subordinated debt. The
Treasury proposal was intended to operate as a check against reckless
growth by institutions with inadequate net worth to support expansion.
In addition, the ability of an institution to place subordinated debt (and
the price paid) would also serve as a useful warning signal for regulators
and others. However, increasing the capital requirement to nine percent
would require an immense infusion of new and expensive capital for
banks, and the proposal justifiably has not won acceptance because of
cost and other factors.
Whatever the abstract merits of the Treasury proposals, the most immediate problem of capital adequacy is presented by the thrift industry.
Significant losses on mortgage portfolios have been supplemented in the
last three years by enormous bad-loan losses among a minority of institutions. Coupled with a decision by the industry's federal regulator to
slash capital requirements by forty percent and to abandon serious ac15
counting, these developments have produced an ominous situation.
This problem cannot be cured overnight, but long-range strategies to
solve the thrift problem must be developed as a high priority. Returning
to common minimum capital levels and accounting principles between
banks and thrifts will be an essential part of any long-run program, as
will replenishment of the financial reserves of the thrift insurance fund.
D.

IMPROVED REGULATION

Improving examination, supervision and enforcement by the regulatory
agencies is perhaps the greatest long-run challenge we face. The financial
regulatory system of the United States is highly decentralized, paralleling
the structure of our marketplace. Seven different federal agencies regulate
14. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. A (1986); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.: Capital
Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital Proposal, 51 Fed. Reg. 6126 (1986) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 325); Federal Reserve System: Bank Holding Companies and Change
in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital Measure, 51 Fed.
Reg. 3976 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225).
15. See, e.g., Deposit InsuranceReform and Related Supervisory Issues, Part I/: Hearing
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (testimony of George Gould, Under Secretary for Finance, U.S. Department of
Treasury (March 4, 1986)).
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financial institutions, 1 6 along with bank, thrift and securities regulators in
each of the fifty states. The result is an exceedingly complicated web of
governmental agencies and the statutory laws they enforce.
The Vice President's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services
was formed in December 1982. The group was led by the Vice President,
and its members included the heads of all seven federal financial regulatory
agencies and six leading members of the Administration. The purpose of
the group was to recommend ways to improve and strengthen our supervision of financial institutions. After a careful study, the Task Group
unanimously adopted more than four dozen recommendations to improve
the regulatory system. These recommendations were set forth in a report
issued in November 1984,17 and they are the subject of legislation that
will soon be introduced in Congress.
The Task Group considered, and unanimously rejected, the possibility
of creating a single centralized bank regulatory agency. In the view of the
members, various important interests of the states and different federal
agencies must continue to be balanced through maintaining checks and
balances among different financial agencies. A single agency would be an
unwieldy bureaucratic monster, and it would create substantial dangers
of financial instability if its policies did not recognize market conditions
or trends.
Rather than centralizing all authority under a single agency, the Task
Group recommended specific steps to streamline the current system, improve agency accountability and strengthen our effectiveness in protecting
depositors, investors and other institutions. Under the Task Group's proposals, both the current Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and
the Federal Reserve Board would regulate banks and their holding companies. Duplication of state regulatory programs would be reduced, and
the FDIC would give up unrelated activities to concentrate its efforts as
assume the role of a watchdog agency for the insurance program. Securities and antitrust enforcement would each be centralized in a single
agency, while bank holding company regulation would be significantly
simplified. Finally, regulation would be based generally on "functional"
lines to permit firms engaging in common activities to be regulated
equivalently.
Over the long run, the Task Group proposals would seek to get government out of the business of allocating market share among different
16. These are the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation for banks; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for thrift
institutions; the National Credit Union Administration for credit unions; the Securities and
Exchange Commission for securities issuers and companies; and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. See, generally, Blueprint for Reform, supra note 13.
17. See supra note 13.
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types of firms and to concentrate on protecting the integrity of the markets.
This would be accomplished through improved capital, accounting and
disclosure policies, better fraud detection and enforcement, consistent
application of antitrust and disclosure principles and similar steps. At the
same time, a substantial amount of wasted paper shuffling and duplicative
agency efforts could be eliminated, thereby reducing the costs of regulation to the public.
These proposals would not solve all of the nation's financial problems,
and they would certainly not make the U.S. regulatory system infallible.
However, these changes would represent a significant improvement over
the system we have today, and would give us a significantly stronger and
more reliable supervisory system.
III. Conclusion
Greater freedom for financial firms to diversify and to compete across
traditional industry lines and state borders offers significant potential benefits for consumers through lower prices, as well as for the overall economy through greater efficiency and international competitiveness. At the
same time, we must recognize that such efficiencies will only be achieved
through exposing banks and other financial firms to greater competitive
pressures than they have faced historically. The overall result will be a
significant benefit to the public and the economy, but only if our regulatory
system can adequatley handle the firms that will not be successful in a
competitive environment. By combining competitive freedom with strong
and effective regulation, the United States has the opportunity to improve
its financial system in a manner that will benefit a wide spectrum of the
public. Correspondingly, a failure to achieve this result will leave United
States firms facing increasingly strong competition from foreign markets
and providers of financial services.
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